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JOHNSON TO SEEK \$9-BILLION MORE FOR VIETNAM WAR

Funds Would Raise Defense
Budget to \$67-Billion in
Current Fiscal Year

TAX OUTLOOK UNCERTAIN

McNamara Confirms Soviet
Is Planning More Missiles
Than U. S. Expected

By MAX FRANKEL

Special to The New York Times

AUSTIN, Tex., Dec. 6—President Johnson disclosed today that he would ask Congress to appropriate \$9-billion to \$10-billion more to pay for the war in Vietnam in the current fiscal year.

Mr. Johnson declined to project from this figure an estimate of the total cost of the war in the fiscal year, ending next June 30. But the new funds would raise the total defense budget to from \$67-billion to \$68-billion.

This in turn would raise total Government expenses to about \$127-billion against an expected income of about \$117-billion.

The President said he had not yet decided whether to seek a tax increase to pay for the indicated deficit of \$10-billion and refused even to speculate about his policy decision.

Budget Review Is Held

Johnson to Ask \$9-Billion More For War in Current Fiscal Year

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Soviet Union was planning to deploy more long-range missiles than American intelligence estimates had indicated.

But that possibility had been taken into account, Mr. McNamara said, pleading for public understanding of "three major points," as follows:

"One. Even if the new intelligence estimate for mid-1968 proves accurate, the United States, without taking any actions beyond those already planned, will continue to have a substantial quantitative and qualitative superiority over the Soviet Union in intercontinental ballistic missiles at that time.

Finds Strength Sufficient

"Two. The United States has as many ICBMs today as the latest national intelligence estimate gives the Soviet Union several years hence.

"Three. Our strategic offensive forces have today and will continue to have in the future the capability of absorbing a deliberate first strike and retaliating with sufficient strength to inflict unacceptable damage upon the aggressor or any combination of aggressors."

Mr. McNamara gave no figures of either Soviet or United States missile strength, except to say that the American numerical advantage remained between 3 and 4 to 1.

Intelligence estimates made in 1965 of the number of Soviet long-range missiles in mid-1967 are turning out to be remarkably accurate—to within five or 10 missiles, the Secretary said.

But the 1965 estimates of Soviet missile strength in 1968 now appear to have been too low, he added, although the

change has "no basic impact on our offensive strategic force requirements."

Some military analysts have reported that the Soviet Union is expected to deploy from 650 to 850 long-range missiles in 1968, figures that compare with past estimates of 600.

Mr. McNamara expressed confidence in the American short-range intelligence estimates. Misjudgments occur, he said, in long-range forecasts that go beyond production lead-times and cannot, therefore, be based on concrete evidence.

In discussing the air war over North Vietnam, the Secretary denied that there had been any new pattern of targets for American planes or any increase in defensive action by Soviet-built MIG fighters.

Targets Still the Same

Recent bombing attacks near Hanoi have been aimed at lines of communication and supporting facilities, the same kind of targets that have hit for more than a year, including petroleum depots, a vehicle maintenance depot and railroad yards, he said.

The MIG responses have been no greater than in past periods, he said, except for a recent period in which bad weather also held down the number of American raids. The number of losses to MIGs has been very small—one aircraft in the last two weeks—and total losses in relation to the number of raids has not varied "substantially" from past periods, he went on.

Most of the American planes have been lost to conventional ground fire from anti-aircraft positions, the Secretary said, but the total losses did not strike him as unusual or abnormal.